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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  04-3174
RULLY SIRAT; HOKKY KHOSYAN,
               Petitioners
 v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
               Respondent
                                         
On Petition for Review of a Final Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A95 369 392
                                          
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 16, 2005
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 20, 2005)
                                          
OPINION 
                                          
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Rully Sirat, and her husband Hokky Khosyan, petition for review of the order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) which denied Sirat’s application for asylum, withholding of removal and
    1We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  The BIA had jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).  The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.2(b).
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relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1  Sirat, a native Indonesian,
testified that she and Khosyan operated a snack shop and potato chip factory in Jakarta,
Indonesia, and lived above the factory.  In the May 1998 riots, the factory burned down. 
Sirat and Khosyan, however, escaped unharmed and lived with her parents.  Sirat entered
the United States in October 1998 and Khosyan followed in December 1998.  
Sirat returned to Indonesia in March 1999 because her father was ill.  She stayed in
Jakarta until April 2001.  While she was in Jakarta, she became pregnant.  Thereafter, she
returned to the United States and delivered a daughter on August 15, 2001.
Sirat claims that she was persecuted on account of her Christian faith and that she
will be persecuted if she is repatriated to Indonesia.  Khosyan seeks derivative status.  In
support of her claim, Sirat cites various church bombings that occurred in Indonesia.  She
testified that while she was in church with her family on December 24, 2000, a bomb
exploded and that six people were injured.  
The IJ did not find Sirat credible.  He explained that she failed to provide any
evidence to corroborate her story that her church was bombed on December 24, 2000.  He
pointed out that the United States Department of State’s Country Conditions Report 
mentioned only bombings in the Mollucas, but none in Jakarta.  Sirat admitted the
Mollucas are more than a thousand miles from Jakarta.  Nor were any affidavits from
Sirat’s family members submitted to confirm that their church was bombed while they
3were attending services on December 24, 2000.  
Sirat appealed to the BIA, which affirmed without opinion.  This timely appeal
followed.  We review the IJ’s opinion and scrutinize his decision to determine if it is
supported by substantial evidence.  Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc).  Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. . . .”  Dia, 353 F.3d at 248  (quoting N.L.R.B. v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that there is substantial evidence
to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.  Other than the uncorroborated church
bombing in December 2000, Sirat offered nothing to establish that she was persecuted on
account of her Christian faith.  Noticeably absent from her testimony was any contention
that she suffered any physical harm.  Rather, she was content to return to and to remain in
Indonesia for two years, including several months after her church was bombed.  These
facts also undermine her claim that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.  Lie
v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005) (observing that the reasonableness of an
alien’s claim of future persecution is undermined when family members remain in her
native country without encountering harm).
Because there is substantial evidence to support the IJ’s denial of Sirat’s claim for
asylum, we need not address her claim for withholding of removal.  Balasubramanrim v.
INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 n.8 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 408 U.S. 421,
430-31 (1987)).  Sirat’s claim for relief under the CAT was waived inasmuch as she
failed to present any legal argument in support of her claim.  Laborers’ Int’l Union v.
Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a
party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue .
.  . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court”).  
We will deny the petition for review filed by Sirat and Khosyan. 
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